Russia mines 29% of antimony and 0.7% of rare earths.

USGS estimated Russian rare earth mine output at 2,600 tonnes of rare-earth oxide in both 2024 and 2025. Reuters placed that flow at about one percent of the global market. The same USGS table assigns Russia 3.8 million tonnes of reserves. 1 2 Russia produces rare earths, although its annual flow remains small beside its geology and state ambition.

Lovozersky mining complex anchors Russia's operating mining and early-processing chain in the Kola Peninsula. Interfax reported 5,800 tonnes of loparite concentrate in 2025. The plan calls for 12,000 tonnes a year by 2030 after mine and ore upgrading reconstruction. A southwest flank with 5.2 million tonnes of ore could extend the operation toward 2050. 3

Loparite concentrate is not a pure rare earth product because it feeds recovery of titanium and tantalum, with niobium recovered as well. The 5,800-tonne concentrate figure cannot replace USGS's 2,600-tonne rare-earth oxide mine estimate because they describe different points in the mass balance.

Rosatom reported modernization at Lovozero in 2026, including higher ore upgrading efficiency and further clean-up work. 4 A useful scorecard at Lovozero pairs annual ore with concentrate output. Recovery and payable rare-earth oxide should be reported separately from the modernization headline.

Russia's advantage is not a reserve ranking. It is an inherited chain that already moves material from an Arctic mine into chemical processing.

What the numbers say

Rosatom's 2024 mining report describes the existing Solikamsk product as a collective rare earth concentrate. The planned expansion would make separate lanthanum and cerium products. Neodymium and praseodymium would also be separated, while a second group stream would combine samarium with gadolinium before retaining europium alongside them. 5 Such a product slate would bridge the central gap between a mixed chemical and a usable magnet chain.

The schedule has already moved from a 2027 launch announced in 2024 to completion in 2028. Public documents were still in state review in March 2026. A later report put construction at the end of 2026. Reported investment was near RUB 10 billion, another sign that this is more than a minor plant modification. 6 7 8

Schedule movement does not establish failure because separation plants are difficult to commission. Adjacent rare earths behave similarly, and small impurity changes can upset customer acceptance. Until state acceptance and continuous product data appear, the 2,500-tonne line belongs in a future-capacity chart.

Sanctions can guarantee domestic political support and captive demand, yet they may restrict specialist equipment and control systems. Finance and insurance face pressure too, while Western customer routes narrow. A state-backed build may complete while still taking longer to reach reliable purity and yield.

Rosatom Metal Tech and Udmurtia signed a special investment contract in February 2024 for a full-cycle NdFeB magnet plant in Glazov. The plant targets 1,000 tonnes of annual capacity by 2028. Expansion could lift planned capacity to 3,000 tonnes after 2030, but neither figure proves Russia produced those tonnes in 2026. 9

A full-cycle claim carries hidden tests, starting with Solikamsk's ability to supply consistent magnet-relevant products. Glazov must convert feed to metal and alloy before controlling grain structure through sintering. Machining and coating come next, followed by customer approval for specific motors or generators. Product sets and small deliveries do not establish a full year at design capacity. 10

Sequencing is tight because Solikamsk and Glazov both point to 2028, yet the magnet plant depends on the separation line or another reliable feed source. Putting two linked chemical and manufacturing operations into trial production in the same year creates a risk of a slow move to steady output that government output targets rarely show.

Russia could have a useful domestic magnet line by 2030 without meeting every state tonnage claim. EarthRarest will count annual sales of customer-approved magnets separately from oxide and metal output. Design capacity belongs in another column until customers accept material at scale, which is the proof the move into later processing and factories actually occurred.

Installed equipment is not a magnet supply chain. Tonnes sold to real customers are.

What the numbers say

A 2019 SRK study reported a probable Tomtor ore reserve of 11.4 million tonnes. Total rare-earth oxide made up 14.5% of the ore, an unusually high grade for a rare earth project. Niobium oxide added another 6.0%, giving the reserve a second product path. 15 Even so, the probable reserve is firmer than a speculative national resource claim yet has still not become a commercial mine.

The deposit lies in the Olenyok Evenki National District of Yakutia, hundreds of kilometres from the nearest settlement and far from the proposed chemical-processing plant. Its historic concept uses winter roads and barges before sea transport hands the material to rail for a journey of thousands of kilometres to Krasnokamensk. 15 Every hand-off adds seasonal and inventory risk, while insurance and construction become harder over the same distance.

Rosneft took complete control in May 2025 after President Putin publicly criticized the operator's delays the previous November. 11 12 The United States Treasury designated Rosneft on 22 October 2025 and reiterated that entities owned 50 percent or more by a blocked person are also blocked. On the disclosed ownership, Tomtor sits behind that United States sanctions barrier. 13

India sought samples from the Rosneft-owned project in June 2026 for testing and possible deeper cooperation. 14 The relationship offers a plausible non-Western route to technology and demand. A sample still falls short of a purchase agreement or final investment decision, with a commissioned processor further away. Community monitoring work in Yakutia identifies Tomtor and wild reindeer as issues requiring local participation rather than technical mitigation from Moscow. 16

Russia's New Materials and Chemistry national project aims to reduce dependence and build fuller value chains. Its own 2030 indicator leaves the import share of rare-metal and rare-earth raw materials and products at 48 percent. 17 The figure is a useful reality check: the official target still assumes material import dependence.

Other official statements have targeted a top-five position and about 12 percent of world output. A separate goal puts broad rare-metal and rare-earth products at 50,000 tonnes by 2030. 2 18 That broad goal is about nineteen times the USGS mine estimate of 2,600 tonnes. Official claims of a sevenfold increase plainly use a different definition.

The most likely forecast is narrower: Lovozero expands while the Solikamsk separation project enters trial production. Glazov begins customer-approved production below its design capacity, and Tomtor remains a later option unless construction evidence appears quickly. That outcome could make Russia more self-reliant without delivering 12 percent of global USGS-comparable mine output.

A useful scorecard through 2030 separates rare-earth oxide-equivalent mine production from individual separated products, while sales of customer-approved sintered magnets get their own line. Broad rare metals totals belong in a separate table with their included products named.